The E-Bomb: The New Threat

by Andrew Hiles

The ElectroMagnetic Pulse (EMP) effect was first observed during the early testing of high-altitude air burst nuclear weapons — a rather radical way of creating an E-bomb. The threat of the E-bomb increased in 1994 when Gen. Loborev, Director of the Central Institute of Physics and Technology in Moscow, distributed a landmark paper at the EUROEM Conference in Bordeaux, France. In this paper, Dr. A. B. Prishchepenko, the Russian inventor of a family of compact, explosive-driven RF munitions, described how RF munitions might be used against a variety of targets including communications systems. The concepts “went public” in articles in Russian naval journals and in other professional journals and magazines.

On June 17, 1997, the US Joint Economic Committee (JEC) held a hearing called Economic Espionage, Technology Transfers and National Security, in which it heard about a new class of weapons — radio frequency weapons (RF) — and the impact of these new weapons on the civilian and military electronic infrastructure of the United States. This was followed up by a further hearing in February 25, 1998. In June 2000, James O’Bryon, deputy director of Live Fire Test & Evaluation at the US Department of Defense, flew to a conference in Scotland to address the issue. “What we’re trying to do is look at what people might use if they wanted to do something damaging,” he said. The UK magazine, New Scientist published a popularist article on the subject on 1 July 2000.

The Technology

The technology base that may be applied to the design of electromagnetic bombs is both diverse, and in many areas, quite mature. Key technologies include explosively pumped Flux Compression Generators (FCG), explosive- or propellant-driven Magneto-Hydrodynamic (MHD) generators, and a range of High Power Microwave (HPM )devices, the leading runner in this area being Virtual Cathode Oscillator or Vircator. A wide range of experimental designs have been tested in these technology areas, and a considerable volume of work has been published in unclassified literature.

A HPM device overcomes technical and size problems of the FCG and MHD technologies. Its output power may be tightly focused, and it has a much better ability to couple energy into many target types. The Vircator is a one-shot HPM device capable of producing a very powerful, single pulse of radiation, yet it is mechanically simple, small and robust, and can operate over a relatively broad band of microwave frequencies.

Hidden targets can be detected using Unintentional Emission (UE) [Readers may be familiar with UE in the context of TEMPEST surveillance] in which transient emanations leaking out from equipment due to poor shielding can be detected and, in many instances, demodulated to recover useful intelligence. (At the height of interest in TEMPEST a few years ago, demodulator equipment in an unmarked van in the city of London was able to “read” screens in a dealing room, and to view sensitive legal and personal information.) These emissions can only be suppressed by rigorous shielding and emission control techniques, such as are employed in TEMPEST-rated equipment.

The relative simplicity of the FCG and the Vircator suggests that any person with even a 1940s technology base, once in possession of engineering drawings and specifications, could make an E-bomb.

For example, a FCG can be made with basic electrical materials, common plastic explosives such as C-4 or Semtex, and readily available machine tools such as lathes and suitable mandrels for forming coils. A two-stage FCG could be built for as little as US$1,000 — 2,000. Ivor Smith, an electrical engineer at Loughborough University who has worked on these devices for years, told New Scientist “You can build flux compressors smaller than a briefcase.”

Obviously, the E-bomb is unlike the conventional bomb: while its ability to destroy equipment will be obvious, its ability to wound may not be. It could simply lead to a series of intermittent, inexplicable, and apparently random failures and data loss.

Defense Against E-Bombs

The most effective defense against an E-bomb is to destroy the E-bomb — but detection is the problem. The alternative is to harden systems. The most effective method is to wholly contain the equipment in an electrically conductive enclosure, termed a Faraday cage, which prevents the electromagnetic field from gaining access to the protected equipment. But most such equipment must communicate with and be fed with power from the outside world, and this can provide entry points for the E-bomb.

Fibre optic cable may solve the problem for communications cabling, but electrical power feeds remain an ongoing vulnerability. Moreover, the current trend is to exploit existing distribution media such as cable TV and telephone wiring to provide multiple Megabit/s of data distribution (e.g., cable modems, ADSL/HDSL/VDSL) to premises. Also, the gradual replacement of coaxial Ethernet networking with 10-Base-T twisted pair equipment has further increased the vulnerability of wiring systems inside buildings

Another way to mitigate potential damage is to fit electromagnetic arresting devices wherever an electrically conductive channel must enter the enclosure. A range of devices that can do this exist; however, care must be taken in determining their parameters to ensure that the devices can deal with the rise time and strength of electrical transients produced by electromagnetic devices.

Hardening of systems must be carried out at a system level, as electromagnetic damage to any single element of a complex system could inhibit the function of the whole system. And, hardening new build equipment and systems will add a substantial cost burden. Older equipment and systems may be impossible to harden properly and may require complete replacement. In simple terms, hardening by design is significantly easier than attempting to harden existing equipment.

For the best protection, the answer is resilience and redundancy, spread over a wide geographic area. Communications networks for voice, data, and services should employ topologies with sufficient redundancy and failover mechanisms to allow them to continue, even with with multiple nodes and links inoperative.

According to New Scientist, criminals may have already used microwave weapons. The magazine quotes Bob Gardner, who chairs the Electromagnetic Noise and Interference Commission of the International Union of Radio Science in Ghent, Belgium. Reports from Russia suggest that these devices have been used to disable bank security systems and to disrupt police communications. Another report suggests a London bank may also have been attacked. While these incidents are hard to prove, they’re perfectly plausible. “If you’re asking whether it’s technologically reasonable that someone could do something like this,” says Gardner, “then the answer is yes.”

The E-bomb threat is, therefore, a real one that you should take seriously, and be alert for the symptoms. If it has not happened already, an E-bomb may be coming to a place near you.

References

“The E-Bomb - A Weapon of Electrical Mass Destruction.” Carlo Kopp, Department of Computer Science Monash University, Clayton, 3168, Australia. http://www.cs.monash.edu.au/~carlo/

“US Joint Economic Committee Hearing Radio Frequency Weapons and Proliferation:
Potential Impact on the Economy.” Wednesday, February 25, 1998 (Texas Engineering Solutions).

(Both of the previous documents have extensive bibliographies.)

Andrew Hiles is a director of the Kingswell International, consultants in risk management (www.kingswell.net). He is the author of Enterprise Risk Assessment and Business Impact Analysis – Best Practice and Business Continuity Planning – Best Practices, published by Rothstein Associates Inc. He can be reached through his Web site, www.kingswell.net.

home